

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY  
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**

**US AND BRAZIL: PROSPECTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY PARTNERS**

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**Course 5604, Seminar L**

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## **US AND BRAZIL: PROSPECTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY PARTNERS**

### **FOREWORD**

Brazil matters—bilaterally, hemispherically, and globally. US policymakers have historically been slow to grasp this. Meanwhile, many “ordinary” Americans don’t even realize that Portuguese, not Spanish, is spoken in this, the world’s fifth largest country. This paper seeks to promote an understanding of Brazil’s importance by discussing it in terms of the one issue that quickly garners the attention of US policymakers and public alike—US national security.

The paper begins by placing Brazil in a geostrategic context, first by highlighting relevant demographic, security, and economic facts and figures. It then briefly outlines US hemispheric interests, before focusing in particular on US-Brazil bilateral interests. Key to this section is published statements by both the outgoing and incoming US presidential administrations, including a revealing August 2000 speech by then-candidate Bush entitled “Century of the Americas.” Next, the paper summarizes challenges and opportunities that confront the United States and Brazil as they tackle mutual national security concerns. A recommendation of an “appropriate” US national security strategy toward Brazil concludes the main text of paper.

The paper includes two annexes. The first provides a brief alternative view of Brazil as a potential US national security concern. The second lists relevant political, military, economic and cultural questions central to gaining a better understanding of Brazil, so that interested parties seeking answers to these questions may truly understand why Brazil, in fact, matters.

## **US AND BRAZIL: PROSPECTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY PARTNERS**

*The United States and Brazil are arguably the two most stable, prosperous nations in this hemisphere. Moreover, they share common national interests of security and prosperity. Yet, despite solid bilateral relations, the two countries often appear to be moving in parallel to, or even at odds with one another, as they pursue these common interests. In order for both nations, along with the hemisphere, to grow more peaceful, stable, and prosperous, the US and Brazil must work together. A partnership, not a zero sum game, is the answer.[\[1\]](#) The Bush administration has an opportunity to pursue this approach, and appears willing to do so.*

## **GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT**

Having successfully transitioned from over 15 years of military dictatorship in 1989, Brazil is now considered a model hemispheric democracy. Still, it faces extreme social inequalities, including differences in income distribution, educational levels, geographic distribution of economic goods and political representation.[\[2\]](#)

Larger than the continental United States, Brazil borders all South American nations except Chile and Ecuador. It has a third of the region's population--160 million in 1996, with an annual growth rate of 1.7%.[\[3\]](#)

About 7 million Brazilians have access to the Internet—the 7<sup>th</sup> largest number

of users in the world.[\[4\]](#)

The Amazon constitutes 60% of the Brazilian territory, but only 12% of its population lives there. Despite oft-cited references to it as the “lungs of the world,” the rainforest harbors environmental management problems that have global climatic and political implications, as well as regional economic and security implications.[\[5\]](#)

A fledgling nuclear power in the 1970s, Brazil made a strategic decision in the 1980s to bolster its commitment to non-proliferation. It ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed an International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguard agreement, agreed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime.[\[6\]](#) Today, absent a traditional security threat (its historical antagonist, Argentina, is now a fully integrated economic partner), it nevertheless maintains the largest military in the region, with 314,000 active duty troops and officers in 1997. Meanwhile, debate in Brazil over the military has been practically nonexistent, with many in the general public showing an almost complete lack of interest in the issue.[\[7\]](#)

Economically, Brazil’s geostrategic position is impressive. In 1998, the Russian and Asian economic crises threatened to undermine Brasilia’s fiscal reform and its free trade progress, forcing the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to assemble a \$41.5 billion financial

aid package for Brazil.<sup>[8]</sup> Brasilia used this aid to regain its footing, and today it is the tenth largest economy in the world, with a 1999 GDP of \$555 billion (constituting about half the GDP of the entire South America).<sup>[9]</sup> In 1999, foreign direct investment inflows reached \$31 billion, ranking it the 4<sup>th</sup> highest investment destination worldwide, behind the US, UK and China. Approximately 420 of the Fortune 500 companies do business in Brazil. Its main trading partners in 1999 were the European Union (28%), the United States (22%) and South America (20%), “reflecting a more balanced distribution of trade than is true of most countries.”<sup>[10]</sup> Given its sheer size, significant fluctuations, positive or negative, in the Brazilian economy have a concomitant effect on the region’s less economically developed, more fragile democracies.<sup>[11]</sup> As opposed to the lack of debate over the country’s military, the state of Brazil’s economy *does* play heavily on the minds (and more importantly, wallets) of Brazilian pundits, politicians, and public alike.

## **US HEMISPHERIC INTERESTS**

The most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS), a Clinton administration document, identifies as our core objectives: “to enhance America’s security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.” Hemispherically, the NSS identifies a number of security

concerns, including eliminating the “scourge of drug trafficking” and fostering regional security cooperation. Under its “promoting prosperity” section, the NSS indicates “formal negotiations are in progress to initiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.” It adds, “we will seek to ensure that the agreement also supports workers rights, environmental protection and sustainable development.” Under the “promoting democracy” section, it notes, “our ability to sustain the hemispheric agenda crafted at the Summit of the Americas depends in part on meeting the challenges posed by weak democratic institutions, persistently high unemployment and crime rates, and serious income disparities.” It further adds, “education is at the centerpiece of reforms aimed at making democracy work for all the people of the Americas.”[\[12\]](#)

The new Bush administration will apparently focus at least as much, maybe more, attention on the hemisphere as did its predecessor. Former President Bush’s vision created the idea of a North America Free Trade Area. He also envisioned a more comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). His son, then-candidate George W. Bush, in an August 2000 speech regarding the region, indicated he would pursue this initiative:

**...Should I become president, I will look South, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency. Just as we ended the great divide between East and West, so today we can overcome the North-South divide. This begins with a renewed commitment to democracy and freedom in this hemisphere because human freedom, in the long run, is our best weapon against poverty, disease and tyranny...The first goal in our hemisphere is democracy. Our second goal is free trade in all the Americas, which will be a step toward**

**free trade in all the world...First, I will secure fast-track authority -- the ability to pass or reject trade agreements without amendment. Without it, as we have seen, America is slow to move, and other nations are unwilling to negotiate with us seriously. When the next president sits at the Americas Summit in Quebec next April, other nations must know that fast-track trade authority is on the way. Our goal will be free trade agreements with all the nations of Latin America. We can do so in cooperation with our NAFTA partners. We should do so with Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, the anchor states of Mercosur. Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, with such vast economic potential, and our relations must reflect this...[13]**

## **US-BRAZIL BILATERAL INTERESTS**

Brazil's Foreign Office, Itamaraty, notes that US-Brazil relations are close, with both nations sharing similar views on democracy, human rights, the environment, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and economic liberalization and integration.[\[14\]](#) The US State Department stresses a traditionally friendly, active relationship between the two countries, encompassing a broad political and economic agenda. Key bilateral topics of discussion and cooperation it identified included trade and finance, hemispheric economic integration, United Nations reform and peacekeeping efforts, non-proliferation and arms control, follow-up to the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas, common efforts to help resolve the Peru-Ecuador border conflict, and support for Paraguay's democratic development, human rights, counternarcotics, and environmental issues.[\[15\]](#) Of anecdotal interest, reportedly a quarter of all US-Brazil trade passes through Florida, with Brazil now ranking as that state's main trading partner. More importantly, the next Summit of the Americas is scheduled to take place in

Quebec City in April 2001. Hemispheric concerns over FTAA negotiation preparations are bound to arise. Actual negotiations are slated to begin in November 2002, with the US and Brazil serving as co-chairs.[\[16\]](#)

## **CHALLENGES OR OPPORTUNITIES?**

Despite apparent shared national interests, there remain several paradoxes in the US-Brazil relationship. While none appear to be critical or insurmountable, they are viewed as challenges insofar as they must be addressed in order for bilateral, hemispheric, and even global security and prosperity to improve. To the degree the Bush administration engages these paradoxes, these challenges may even be viewed as opportunities, where the new team can make significant inroads. A brief review of some security and prosperity challenges/opportunities, including an illustrative example of the Amazon rainforest, may be useful before proposing what an “appropriate” Bush administration national security strategy toward Brazil should look like.

### **Security**

It has already been noted that international security and defense issues are absent from the Brazilian national debate. That is not to say that Brazilian military forces are adverse to engaging in security operations; Brazil simply sees its security role differently than the US sees its role. Over the past decades, Brazil has participated in several peacekeeping missions, including in the Middle East,

Cyprus, Mozambique and Angola; and Brasilia played a significant role in resolving Peru-Ecuador border disputes.[\[17\]](#) Still, the country has thus far not expressed an interest in having standing forces allocated under Mercosul, OAS or some other pan-American regional control, preferring instead to direct its military personnel, equipment, and money to UN collective security efforts.[\[18\]](#) Brazil's hesitation regarding regional peacekeeping operations stands in sharp contrast to the US' approach, which historically has been viewed by Latin nations as arrogant and heavy-handed in hemispheric security affairs. This perception, coupled with fiscal and personnel constraints on the part of US Southern Command, suggests a need for non-US regional partners to play a leadership role in hemispheric peacekeeping and security operations. Argentina has sought to play such a role, but recall that it is Brazil, not Argentina, which is Latin America's largest security and economic force.[\[19\]](#)

## **Prosperity**

As previously discussed, Brazil's Itamaraty identified economic liberalization and integration as two shared US-Brazil foreign policy goals. Yet, upon closer inspection one notes a considerable divergence between the two countries' perspectives on this matter. As in the military arena, Brazil's focus is much narrower than that of the United States. Specifically, Brazil seeks first to manage economic integration with Argentina, and secondly with the smaller economies of

Paraguay and Uruguay. These four countries constitute the Southern Cone Common Market, or *Mercosul* (*Mercosur* in Spanish).[\[20\]](#) “Mercosul with its difficulties and opportunities has become the main blip on Brasilia’s radar screen. It dominates President Cardoso’s agenda in international affairs and has a huge impact on government ministries in mobilizing ideas and resources. It is doubtful that any other arena will change this focus.”[\[21\]](#)

This poses another difficult dilemma for the Bush administration, which has made *hemispheric* free trade an early priority. As one astute US-Brazil observer noted, “the lack of proactive policy by Clinton on FTAA gave Brasilia a breathing space to fashion an alternative policy, a series of building blocks which it was believed would strengthen Brazil’s hand in forthcoming negotiations with North America, initially by solidifying Mercosul, later by seeking bilateral free trade agreement between Mercosul and other South American countries, and by pursuing an illusory prospect of a free trade deal with Europe intended to balance the hegemony of the north”[\[22\]](#) An official Brazilian perspective on Brazil’s approach to hemispheric free trade was provided in June 1999 by the General-Secretary of Itamaraty, Ambassador Luiz Feleipe de Seixas Correa:

**We have the firm objective to retain a minimum parallel process in the negotiations for the formation of the 2005 American Free Trade Area and opening markets also with European Union. We do not wish to attach ourselves preferentially with a single commercial partner. We give central priority to the maintenance of a balanced pattern in the geographic distribution of our trade flow and foreign investments. This means to secure for Brazil**

greater maneuvering grounds for international economic negotiations.[\[23\]](#)

## The Amazon—An Illustrative Example

A study of Brazil’s Amazon region nicely encapsulates the paradox of these “shared” US-Brazil objectives. Many Americans view the Amazon rainforest as a global ecological treasure, whose protection is a global concern. As a consequence, many of these same Americans sponsor “Save the Rainforest” concerts and fundraising campaigns to maintain the Amazon. While Brazil acknowledges the importance of its rainforest, it views Amazon management, ecological or otherwise, as a national, not international (*and certainly not American*) concern. Instead, for Brazil, a more immediate concern is the permeability of the country’s Amazon border with Colombia. “The militarization of the fight internally against drugs in Colombia...produced a perception in Brazil that violence may spread across the border into Brazilian territory, either from Colombian groups desiring sanctuary or from repressive Colombian state forces...acting in hot pursuit.” Brazil views cross-border incursions as a sovereignty issue, and drugs as a “police, legal, and health problem, not a moral or national security threat.”[\[24\]](#) Brasilia has chosen to counter these “problems” by developing a \$1.4 billion regional Amazon radar surveillance and vigilance system (known as SIVAM, scheduled to be fully operational in 2002) and reinforcing Brazilian military and police forces along its

1,000 mile Amazon border with Colombia in an operation dubbed *Plan Cobra*.[\[25\]](#)

Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, the US has deemed the elimination of the “scourge of drug trafficking” a national security concern. It has provided a \$1.3 billion assistance package to Colombia in support of that country’s *Plan Colombia*. A large percentage of the US package is for the procurement and support of helicopters, along with in-country US military training and equipping of three Colombian anti-drug battalions.[\[26\]](#) This US involvement, sometimes viewed as a *US-imposed* solution, is a growing concern for Brazil. “Although Brazil regards the United States in a generally positive light, it has no desire to see US troops in South America even if they are there to address a regional scourge such as drug trafficking.”[\[27\]](#) While it appears both the US and Brazil acknowledge Colombia’s internal situation pose significant concerns, Washington and Brasilia are pursuing policies and actions *independent of* one another. For Brasilia, as important as what is going on in the border region, is the lens through which it perceives that reality. The Amazon, like other bilateral, hemispheric, or global issues, is viewed by Brazil through the prism of *internal* social and economic concerns. In fact, the country’s internal dynamics have a strong influence on its foreign policy objectives, according to a noted Brazilian scholar, who formerly served in the senior levels of that country’s national

security establishment.[\[28\]](#) He highlights existing sharp differences in income distribution, educational levels, geographic distribution of economic product, and political representation throughout Brazil, and illustrates his point, interestingly enough, by focusing on the Amazon. The region's "roads and long rivers have barely attended the needs of the local population...Many people in the remote Amazon territories are left to the small-scale operations of traders who peddle cheap consumer goods across borders...Uncertain markets, political violence, and lawlessness prevent large-scale private investment from moving into the region." Brasilia must deal with these inequalities if it is to grow more economically and politically stable, and become more successful in the international arena.[\[29\]](#)

## **APPROPRIATE US STRATEGY TOWARD BRAZIL**

Brazil's Ambassador to the US, Rubens Antonio Barbosa, during a July 2000 testimony to Congress, stated, "Brazil and the United States are the two major countries of this Hemisphere. They share the desire, and the commitment, to see this entire region proper and consolidate its democratic institutions. They share a vision of a common future with fewer inequities and more social justice for all the peoples of the Americas, North and South. They share a determination to see this Hemisphere free from drug trafficking and other forms of organized transnational crime. They can and must work together in order to advance our shared goals." His perspective is on target. A partnership, not a zero sum game,

is the answer.[\[30\]](#)

The Clinton administration's NSS acknowledges that "American engagement must be tempered by recognition that there are limits to America's involvement in the world."[\[31\]](#) Given that Latin America is geographically in our "backyard" and thus by default, a geostrategic arena for the US, it is important to develop a strong, coherent policy, that considers bilateral and multilateral approaches to regional national security. A progressive, reasoned US national strategy toward Brazil is a necessary step in attaining such a policy. The framework for such a strategy should include:

- **Conducting a comprehensive review of US-Brazil relations in the context of shared US-Brazilian hemispheric interests and Brazilian domestic concerns.** Ambassador Barbosa argues that given that there are no imminent military threats originating in the region, the US should expand its definition of "security" to encompass not only defense matters but also everything from the economy to the environment, from trade to immigration.[\[32\]](#) The Clinton Administration's NSS has already identified these, along with democracy and human rights, as US national interests. *The two countries share interests of security, prosperity, democracy and respect for human rights.* Moreover, both countries recognize that when there is security and prosperity, it is more likely that human rights will be honored and democracy will truly emerge—including free elections, peaceful transfer of power, rule of law, and a system of checks and balances—and international conflict will become less likely. Accepting the premise that a strong, vibrant, free market democracy in Brazil serves both countries, the US must be prepared to support Brazil (rhetorically, technically and financially) as it focuses on the domestic political and economic reforms it has been implementing over the past several years. Specific challenges remain in redistribution of income and of political representation, management of its domestic and international debt, and continued imposition of fiscal and monetary discipline.[\[33\]](#)
- **Wherever possible, fostering a win-win policy.** Given other US global concerns (e.g., Middle East Peace Process, Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass destruction, the former

Yugoslav Republics, etc), Brazil does not currently rank high on our international scope. However, the US should think more broadly and more long-term, and work with countries throughout the world to ***prevent crisis before they arise***. Regionally, for the reasons stated above, Washington should look toward Brasilia. The US should think not in terms of ***fixing*** Brazil, but instead, ***partnering*** with it. Stated another way, instead of considering what the US can do ***for*** Brazil, the catch phrase should be what the United States can do ***with*** Brazil to achieve our ***common*** interests. Yet, the US will only achieve significant inroads with Brazil if Brasilia feels it is part of a cooperative, rather than competitive, relationship. Capricious, arbitrary power projection on the part of the US may work in the short-term, but will likely fail in the long term, and will almost assuredly breed lasting contempt during its imposition. One way to begin fostering a win-win policy is by acknowledging/highlighting Brazil's regional stature through existing venues (such as the *Brazil at the Wilson Center*) where high-level, official and unofficial dialogue on bilateral relations already is occurring. Projecting a more pro-Brazil stance in the US media is another idea worthy of consideration.[\[34\]](#)

- **Strengthening bilateral security cooperation**, beginning with the Colombia crisis. As was suggested earlier in this paper, Colombia's internal crisis has had negative, albeit different, spillover effects in both Washington and Brasilia, which nevertheless threaten our respective security and prosperity. A *mutually supportive* approach to this problem, not the current parallel approaches, is needed. Critical to this effort is an increase in bilateral security consultation and information/intelligence sharing. Colombia is not the only regional security concern; challenges to democracy exist in Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay. In his January 2001 meeting with Mexican Foreign Minister Castaneda, US Secretary of State Powell apparently indicated that the Bush administration may be open to more non-US leadership in regional security concerns. [\[35\]](#) Given Brazil's stature in South America, it is worth Washington considering Brasilia play a much more significant, possibly leadership, role regarding Colombia and other regional security initiatives. There has been some precedence for this—the US and Brazil worked together to resolve the Peru-Ecuador border conflict and Brazil has worked diligently to sustain democracy in Paraguay over the past several years.[\[36\]](#)
- **Revitalizing the momentum of FTAA.** In the proposed expanded definition of national security mentioned above, regional economic integration would play a significant role in obtaining hemispheric security and prosperity. As one Brazil observer noted, in order to pursue this, President Bush “will need to get his Latin America and trade appointees quickly in place and if at all possible, obtain fast-track authority aimed at creating a Free Trade Association of the Americas.”[\[37\]](#) Why is FTAA so important? As one free trade proponent notes, FTAA signals to the international community a sustained regional commitment to trade liberalization. It encourages decisiveness in domestic market-oriented reforms among the respective regional countries. Finally, it fosters transparency, facilitates information sharing

and dispute settlement on trade issues.<sup>[38]</sup> The Clinton administration's NSS adds that such an agreement would not be contrary to supporting workers rights, environmental protection and sustainable development.<sup>[39]</sup> For President Bush, obtaining fast track authority is only part of the solution. He must also understand that for Brazil, strengthening of Mercosul is its paramount foreign policy issue—ahead of, but not exclusionary of FTAA. “Integration between the four [Mercosul] countries is not a goal in itself...To the contrary, Mercosul is a mechanism for promoting better integration into the international economy.” In addition, the Bush team must understand that Brazil will not negotiate FTAA issues from a position of weakness. Recall that Brazil practices a balanced trade approach, as reflected in its 1999 trade figures—28% with the European Union, 22% with the United States, and 20% with other South American countries. Moreover, Brazil has access to the region’s abundant oil, gas, coal and water resources.<sup>[40]</sup> By taking action on fast track authority, and by acknowledging Brazil’s position vis-à-vis regional free trade, the Bush administration should be able to successfully revitalize the momentum of FTAA, which is in the national security interest of the US, Brazil and the region writ large.

The above framework for an appropriate Bush administration national security strategy toward Brazil is not magical, mystical, or even necessarily difficult. It does, however, require some humility on the part of the United States. A senior national security official in former President Bush’s administration, recently suggested to National War College students that the United States should act *multilaterally whenever possible, and unilaterally only whenever necessary.*<sup>[41]</sup> In keeping with that advice, and given that the US and Brazil have common national security goals, it behooves Washington to combine its efforts and ideas with those of Brasilia in order to achieve these goals, particularly in this era of limited resources. A bilateral approach, as a first step toward multilateral consensus on regional national security issues, will almost assuredly be more

difficult and time consuming than a US unilateral approach, yet, it would be more enduring, and in the end, that is more important. Given President's Bush's statements while a candidate for office, and his affinity toward the hemisphere, it is very possible that he will pursue this route. He should—it is the right thing to do.

## **Annex 1**

### **Brazil As A Potential National Security Concern**

Donald E. Schulz, in his comprehensive March 2000 monograph entitled, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future, suggests that it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. He identifies Brazil as that possible competitor, arguing it "already accounts for almost half of Latin America's economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region." He cites as further evidence the Brazilian military's secret pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s before Brasilia decided to commit to nuclear non-proliferation. He cautions, "if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil's nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations," then adds "if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis [Angra I] were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its

defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability.”[\[42\]](#) According to the US State Department, a second Angra dos Reis was, after years of delays, about to come on line, as of July 2000. Moreover, an Angra III is planned. When completed, the three reactors would have combined capacity of 3,000 megawatts.[\[43\]](#)

Using the Amazon as a rallying point against “foreign intervention” would fit a scenario where Brazil played the part of a peer competitor. One high ranking Brazilian military officer, former chief of the Military Command of the Amazon General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, already alluded to this possibility, when he suggested in 1991 that Brazil would transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon.[\[44\]](#) A return to Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, though very unlikely, is not unthinkable. Although it should not be discounted completely, it should be given the appropriate attention it deserves (such as in an annex to a generally positive paper on US-Brazilian national security relations).

## ANNEX 2

Before one can adequately prepare a comprehensive US national security strategy toward Brazil, one must understand that country. One cannot understand Brazil without studying and visiting it. A National War College Regional Studies Seminar team will have the opportunity to do just that. The following political, military, economic and cultural questions will serve to focus the team’s study of Brazil in order to truly understand why Brazil, in fact, matters:

### **POLITICAL**

- In Brazil, state governors are very autonomous and yield considerable power. Could you explain the relationship/interaction between the states and the Brazilian

federal government? What is Brazil's concept of federalism?

- Could you describe the relevant strengths and weaknesses of Brazil's executive branch vis-à-vis its legislative and judicial branches? Are there adequate checks and balances?
- Many nascent democracies have a weak judicial branch of government. Brazil is considered a vibrant democracy. Is its judicial system considered "strong" in comparison to other countries in the region? In the world?
- Unlike in the US, political parties in Brazil are weak. Given this, what platform/power base do Brazilian politicians use to get elected? Get their political message across? Build coalitions?
- One way to evaluate a democracy's maturity is to look at the political role of certain key non-government institutions. What is the historical and current role in Brazil of organized labor? The Catholic Church? The media?
- Some argue that the Organization of American States (OAS) is weak and ineffective for a number of reasons, including because it operates by consensus. What is Brazil's view of the OAS? What role should the OAS play in regional affairs?
- The United States is often viewed as arrogant and heavy-handed in hemispheric affairs. What is your view of the United States' foreign policy toward the region? Toward Brazil?

## MILITARY

- Notwithstanding the 1947 Rio Treaty and the 1948 Bogota Pact, the inter-American security system is often considered weak and in need of reform. What is Brazil's view of the system? If it is need of reform, what type of reform is needed? What role should Brazil play in a revised system? What role should the US play?
- With its historical challenger (Argentina) now a fully integrated economic partner as a result of *Mercosul*, Brazil faces no traditional threats. Yet the military's

traditional role is to safeguard the country's sovereignty from foreign enemies. What then is the proper role for the Brazilian military? Should it have an expanded internal security role? Peacekeeping role? What is its relation with Brazilian law enforcement organizations, including the police? Its relation with other regional militaries?

- The Brazilian Ministry of Defense is a fairly new institution. What is its role vis-à-vis the respective military services in terms of defense policymaking? Hardware acquisition? Programming and budgeting? Organizing, training and equipping of the forces?
- How successful is the Brazilian military in operating "jointly" among the services?
- What should Brazil's role be vis-à-vis Colombia's internal security crisis? What is Brazil's view of *Plan Colombia*? Of the US role in/support for the plan?
- Brazil is reacting to the spill-over effect of Colombia's crisis by developing an Amazon vigilance and surveillance system known as *SIVAM* and by augmenting military and other security forces along its 1,000 mile Amazon border with Colombia. How is this working?
- Why in Brazil are narcotics considered solely a health and crime issue and not a national security issue, like in the US?

## ECONOMIC

- Brazil has placed a higher priority on consolidated subregional free trade under *Mercosul* than on hemispheric free trade under a *Free Trade of the Americas Agreement*. Meanwhile, the US views hemispheric free trade as a priority goal. How can Brazil and the US work together to find common ground?
- Brazil faces a significant problem with unequal distribution of wealth throughout the country. What is Brazil doing about this? Specifically, in the Amazon region of Brazil? What about in the *favelas* of Rio and Sao Paulo?

- Education is often seen as panacea for improving one's economic lot in life. What is Brazil doing to improve/standardize education throughout the country?

## CULTURAL

- The stereotypical view of Brazil is that it is a land of samba, soccer, carnival and beaches. It is clearly much more than that. What would you like us to take away about Brazil?
- Slavery (Indian and African) ended in Brazil approximately twenty years after it did in the US. Yet in Brazil, there does not appear to be any significant historical scars resulting from this despicable practice. Why?
- Brazilians from all different origins (Portuguese, Italian, Arab, Japanese, Africans, etc) have apparently assimilated into Brazilian culture so successfully that members of these groups want to be viewed as Brazilians and not by their countries/places of origin. How has Brazil successfully accomplished this? How successful has Brazil been in assimilating its native Tupi Guarani and Tapuia Indians into Brazilian society?
- The Amazon belongs to Brazil, yet it is often referred to as the “lungs of the world.” How is Brazil dealing with this dichotomy?

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## ENDNOTES

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[1] Ambassador Rubens Antonio Barbosa, "The United States and Brazil: Strategic Partners or Regional Competitors?," Prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, House Committee on International Relations, 26 Jul 2000, available at [http://www.brasilemb.org/policy/hearing\\_intro.htm](http://www.brasilemb.org/policy/hearing_intro.htm). (Hereafter referred to as "Ambassador Barbosa statement.")

[2] Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Brazil in the New Decade: Searching for a Future, CSIS, September 2000, p. 11. (Hereafter referred to as "Costa.")

[3] US Department of State, Background Notes: Brazil, July 2000, available at [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/brazil\\_0700\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/brazil_0700_bgn.html). (Hereafter referred to as “State Department Background Notes, Brazil.”)

[4] Ambassador Barbosa statement.

[5] “Brazil developing grand radar system to monitor Amazon forests, CNN.com, 18 Oct 2000, available at <http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/10/18/brazil.amazon.surveillance.reut/>.

[6] State Department Background Notes, Brazil.

[7] Library of Congress, Brazil Article, Chapter 5, “National Security,” data as of April 1997, available at [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+br0115\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+br0115)).

[8] “A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on US Policy Toward Brazil,” Statement of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, February 2001, available at [http://www.cfr.org/p/pubs/Brazil\\_TaskForce.html](http://www.cfr.org/p/pubs/Brazil_TaskForce.html). (Hereafter referred to as “CFR.”)

[9] State Department background notes, Brazil. Also, CFR.

[10] Ambassador Barbosa statement.

[11] Donald E. Schulz, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000, p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as “Schulz.”)

[12] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, pp. iii, 3, 15, and 40-41. (Hereafter referred to as “NSS.” It is important to note that while this is, in fact, the most recent NSS, it is a Clinton Administration document. The Bush Administration had yet to publish a new NSS at the time of this paper’s drafting.

[13] Governor George W. Bush, Speech entitled: “Century of the Americas,” Miami, FL, Aug 2000, available at <http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/index.html>.

[14] Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) Web page, Section entitled “North America: United States, available at <http://www.mre.gov.br/cdbrasil/itamaraty/web/ingles/relex/mre/relreg/ammnorte/eua/index.htm>.

[15] State Dept Background Notes, Brazil.

[16] CFR.

[17] State Department Background Notes, Brazil. Of note, Brazil supported the Allies in both World Wars, including sending an expeditionary force to Italy during World War II. That force, played a key role in the Allied victory at Monte Castello.

[18] Costa, p. 22.

[19] Francis Esquivel, “Argentine Peacekeeping Forces Background Notes,” National War College, RSS paper, 20 Nov 2000.

[20] Costa, p. 7.

[21] Costa, p. 22.

[22] Kenneth Maxwell, “George W., King Canute, and Brazil,” article published by Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Dec 2000. (Hereafter referred to as “Maxwell.)

[23] Costa, p. 27.

[24] Costa, pp. 26,31.

[25] “Brazil begins security operation along border with Colombia,” CNN.com, 27 Sep 2000, available at <http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/27/brazil.colombia.ap/>. Also, “Brazil developing grand radar system to monitor Amazon Forests,” CNN.com, 18 Oct 2000, available at <http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/10/18/brazil.amazon.surveillance.reut/>.

[26] “United States Support for Colombia,” Fact Sheet released by the State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 19 Jul 2000, available at

[http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs\\_000719\\_plancolombia.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000719_plancolombia.html). Of the \$7.5 billion program known as *Plan Colombia*, \$1.3 billion is being provided by the US. There are five components of US assistance: Support for Human Rights and Judicial Reform (\$122 million), Expansion of Counternarcotics Operations into Southern Colombia (\$390.5 million—including procurement support, and refurbishment of helicopters for use by the Colombian Army), Alternative Economic Development (\$81 million), Increased Interdiction Efforts (\$129.4 million), and Assistance for the Colombian National Police (\$115.6 million).

[27] Costa, p. 31.

[28] Costa, p. 18.

[29] Costa, pp. 25-26.

[30] Ambassador Barbosa statement.

[31] NSS, p.3.

[32] Ambassador Barbosa statement.

[33] CFR.

[34] Brazil at the Wilson Center Project, Newsletter entitled: “Thinking Brazil,” Issue No. 3, Nov 2000, available at <http://wwics.si.edu/brazil/support/thinkbraz3.pdf>.

[35] Washington Post, 31 Jan 2001, p. A16. Powell reportedly was very supportive of ongoing Mexican mediation between Colombia and Venezuela. The key is whether he will be supportive of other Latin American nations, such as Brazil, playing a similar role in the region.

[36] CFR.

[37] Maxwell.

[38] Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Future of Inter-American Relations,” A Working Paper sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue, June 1999, pp. 12-15.

[39] NSS, p. 40.

[\[40\]](#) Ambassador Barbosa statement.

[\[41\]](#) Former Bush Administration Senior National Security Official speech to NWC students, Fall 2000.

[\[42\]](#) Schulz, pp. 26-27.

[\[43\]](#) State Dept Background Notes, Brazil.

[\[44\]](#) Schulz, p. 28.